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Abstract—Nodes in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) usually
cooperate and forward each other’s packets in order to enable
out of range communication. However, in hostile environments
some nodes may refuse to do so for either saving their resources
or intentionally disrupting regular communications. This type
of misbehavior is generally referred as packet dropping attack
or black hole attack, which is considered as one of the most
destructive attacks that leads to the deterioration of network
performance.
The special network characteristics, such as limited battery
power and mobility of nodes, make prevention techniques based
on cryptographic primitives ineffective to cope with such attack.
Rather, a more proactive alternative is required to ensure the
safety of the forwarding function by staving off malicious nodes
from being involved in routing paths. Once such scheme fails,
some economic-based approaches can be adopted to alleviate
the attack consequences by motivating the nodes cooperation.
As backup, detection and reaction schemes remain as the final
defense line to identify the misbehaving nodes and punish them.
In this survey, we make a comprehensive investigation on
state-of-the-art countermeasures to packet dropping attack. Fur-
thermore, we examine the challenges that must be tackled
for constructing an in-depth defense against such sophisticated
attack.
Index Terms—Ad Hoc Networks, Routing Protocols Security,
Packet Dropping Attack, Black Hole Attack
I. INTRODUCTION
MOBILE ad hoc networks (MANETs) are usually formedby a group of mobile nodes, interconnected via wireless
links, which agree to cooperate and forward each other’s
packets. One of the basic assumptions for the design of
routing protocols in MANETs is that every node is honest and
cooperative. That means, if a node claims it can reach another
node by a certain path or distance, the claim is trusted/true;
similarly, if a node reports a link break, the link will no longer
be used. While this assumption can fundamentally facilitate the
design and implementation of routing protocols, it meanwhile
introduces a vulnerability to several types of denial of service
(DoS) attacks [41], particularly packet dropping attack. To
launch such attack, a malicious node can stealthily drop some
or all data or routing packets passing through it.
Due to the lack of physical protection and reliable medium
access mechanism, packet dropping attack represents a serious
threat to the routing function in MANETs. A foe can easily
join the network and compromise a legitimate node then sub-
sequently start dropping packets that are expected to be relayed
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in order to disrupt the regular communications. Consequently,
all the routes passing through this node fail to establish a
correct routing path between the source and destination nodes.
Although upper layer acknowledgment, such as TCP ACK
(Transmission Control Protocol ACKnowledgment) can detect
end-to-end communication break, it is unable to identify
accurately the node which contributes to that. Moreover, such
mechanism is unavailable in connectionless transport layer
protocols like UDP (User Datagram Protocol). Therefore,
securing the basic operation of the network becomes one of
the primary concerns in hostile environments in the presence
of packets droppers. The challenge lies in securing commu-
nication meanwhile maintaining connectivity between nodes
despite of the attacks launched by the foes and the frequently
changing topology. It is thus obvious that both phases of the
communication, mainly route discovery and data transmission
phase, should be protected, calling for comprehensive security
studies.
While a number of surveys [21], [26], [29] and [42], dealing
with security threats against routing protocols in MANETs,
have provided some insightful overviews on different threats
and countermeasures, none of them focuses on a specific
attack and examines all its characteristics in different routing
techniques. To complement those efforts, this work studies
the packet dropping attack, which is known as one of the
most destructive threats in MANETs, and illustrates in depth
the different schemes used by adversaries targeting on both
reactive and proactive protocols. Furthermore, we conduct an
up-to-date survey of the most valuable contributions aiming
to avoid the packet droppers. The careful examination and
analysis has allowed us to carry out a comparative study of the
existing security schemes in terms of specific design rationale
and objectives. The ultimate goal is to identify the strengths
and weaknesses of each scheme in order to devise a more
effective and practical solution which can achieve a better
trade-off between security and network performance.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In next
section, we discuss the root causes of dropping packets in
MANETs. Section III describes the Black hole attack in both
reactive and proactive routing protocols. An overview of the
proposed security schemes for defending against this attack is
given in section IV. In section V, some open challenges related
to the herein presented attack and solutions are highlighted.
Finally, section VI concludes the paper and points out future
research directions.
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II. ROOT CAUSES OF PACKET DROPPING IN MANETS
Before analyzing the packet dropping attack in details, let
us first summarize the different motives that incite some nodes
to drop a packet rather than sending or relaying it. In general,
a packet can be dropped at either MAC or network layers due
to the following reasons:
• The size of packets’ transmission buffer at MAC level
is limited; therefore whenever the buffer is full any new
packet arriving from higher layers will be dropped (buffer
overflow).
• IEEE 802.11 protocol’s [4] rules: a data packet is dropped
if its retransmission attempts or the one of its corre-
sponding RTS (Request To Send) frame has reached the
maximum allowed number, owing to node’s movement
or collision (a lot of contending nodes).
• A data packet may be dropped or lost if it is corrupted
during transmission due to some phenomenon specific to
radio transmissions such as interference, hidden nodes
and high bit error rate.
In addition to these causes, a selfish node may refuse to
relay a packet aiming to economize its energetic resources
in order to extend its lifetime or simply because its battery
power is drained. Moreover a malicious node involved in a
routing path may intentionally drop the packets at network
layer in order to provoke a collapse in network performances.
Furthermore, it can modify the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol’s
parameters to provoke packet dropping. According to this
analysis, packet dropping problem still open the door to new
challenges in MANETs. For example, how can we recognize
the reason leading a node to drop others’ packets? In other
words, how can we know the intention of a node to accuse it
as malicious, selfish or legitimate?
III. BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN MANETS
The black hole attack in MANETs can be classified into
several categories in terms of the strategy adopted by the
malicious node to launch the attack. In particular the malicious
node can intentionally drop all the forwarded packets going
through it (black hole), or it can selectively drop the packets
originated from or destined to certain nodes that it dislikes.
Furthermore, a special case of black hole attack dubbed gray
hole attack is introduced in [23]. In this attack, the malicious
node retains a portion of packets (one packet out of N received
packets or one packet in a certain time window), while the rest
is normally relayed.
In order to launch a black hole attack, the first step for a
malicious node is to find a way that allows it to get involved
in the routing/forwarding path of data/control packets. To do
so, it exploits the vulnerabilities of the underlying routing
protocols which are generally designed with strong assumption
of trustworthiness of all the nodes participating in the network.
Thus, any node can easily misbehave and provoke a severe
harm to the network by targeting both data and control packets.
Dropping data packets leads to suspend the ongoing com-
munication between the source and the destination node. More
seriously, an attacker capturing the incoming control packets
can prevent the associated nodes from establishing routes
Fig. 1: Route discovery in AODV
between them. To facilitate understanding, we illustrate them
using two representative routing protocols in MANETs, OLSR
(Optimized Link State Routing) [16] and AODV (Ad hoc On
Demand Distance Vector) [14], which are table-driven and on-
demand respectively.
A. Routing protocol-specific attack
We first address black hole problem in the two routing
protocols cited above.
1) Black hole attack in AODV: In order to discover a new
path towards a faraway destination, the source node broadcasts
a RREQ (Route REQuest) message with unique identifier to all
its neighbors. Each receiver rebroadcasts this RREQ to all its
neighbors until reaching the intended destination as depicted in
Fig. 1. On receiving the RREQ message, the destination node
updates the sequence number of the source node and sends a
RREP (Route REPly) message back to its neighbor which has
relayed the RREQ. On the other hand, an intermediate node
having a route to the destination with destination sequence
number greater or equal to the one in RREQ can send back a
RREP packet to the source node without relaying the RREQ
to the destination. Notice that the links between nodes may
be lost due to nodes’ mobility, so a RERR (Route ERRor)
message is generated and forwarded back to the source node
to report the link failure. Thus, the source node initiates a new
route discovery to replace the failed path.
The DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) [5] protocol uses the
same mechanism as AODV to discover new routes, however
the complete path to the destination is chosen by the source
node and loaded in the packet header. All the intermediate
nodes have to relay the packets with respect to the route
specified in the packet header. This feature is important in
some cases in order to satisfy QoS (Quality of Service) [47]
requirements by performing load balancing between the relay
nodes. In this case, the source node sends the packets through
different paths to avoid overloading any node in the network.
In on-demand routing protocols, dropping control packets
might be the greatly benefit for both selfish and malicious
nodes. Specifically, once dropping the RREQ packets, a selfish
node prevents the established routes from passing through
it and consequently it saves its energy for transmitting its
own packets. Likewise, a malicious node can drop the RERR
packets in order to prolong the duration of use of the broken
routes. As a result, the network throughput collapses sharply
since no packet reaches its destination.
A prerequisite for a node to launch a black hole attack is
to be involved at least in one routing path. To this end, the
MANUSCRIPT SUBMITTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 3
Fig. 2: Black hole attack in AODV
TABLE I: The values of the different fields of RREQ and
RREP packets sent or forwarded by both legitimate and
malicious nodes: (i) the nodes A1 and A2 forward correctly
the RREQ and RREP packets (ii) the node C spoofs the
destination node’s address (D) and augments illegitimately the
Dst-Seq-Num
RREQ RREP
Sender S A1 A2 D A2 A1 C
IP-src S A1 A2 D A2 A1 D
Dst-adr D S S
Dst-Seq-Num 40 41 55
malicious node applies the strategies illustrated below.
• As shown in Fig. 2, C is a malicious node whereas S
and D are the source and destination nodes, respectively.
First, the node S broadcasts RREQ packet to its one
hop neighbors. Then, upon receiving this packet each
neighbor node is supposed to rebroadcast it if a route
cache towards the destination is unavailable. However,
the node C disobeys this rule and claims that it has the
shortest path to the destination and sends a RREP packet
back to node S. Consequently, if the RREP packet sent
by node D or any honest intermediate node, which has a
fresh route to D, reaches the node S before the C’s RREP
then everything works well. Otherwise, the source node
S deems that the route passing through the node C is the
shortest path, and thus it starts transmitting data packets
towards C which in its turn drops them.
• Another strategy to launch the attack can be described as
follows: an intermediate node C spoofs the IP address of
the destination D, inciting the source node S to establish
the path towards C, instead of D. To illustrate that let
us consider the network topology depicted in Fig. 2,
when the attacker node C receives a RREQ packet it
transmits a RREP packet to reply back to S claiming that
it is the intended destination. Moreover, it increases the
Destination Sequence Number (Dst-Seq-Num) received
in RREQ packet by a value larger than one as shown in
Table I, where the node C sets Dst-Seq-Num to 55 rather
than 41 to guarantee that the source node S chooses it
as the actual destination. The consequences of this attack
strategy are similar to the previous one.
2) Black hole attack in OLSR: The Optimized Link State
Routing protocol (OLSR) is a proactive routing protocol de-
signed for large and dense networks. The main optimization of
this protocol is achieved through the use of MPRs (MultiPoint
Fig. 3: The MPR set of node T before launching the attack
Fig. 4: The new MPR set of node T after the spoofing link
attack is launched
Relays) which are a set of neighbor nodes that represent the
unique responsible for spreading the local link state infor-
mation to the whole network, thereby reducing the induced
overhead. Notice that the local link state information is peri-
odically advertised by the MPR nodes via the transmission of
TC (Topology Control) messages. In OLSR, each node selects
its MPR set from its one hop neighbors set such that it can
easily reach all its two hop neighbors with minimum number
of retransmissions. The MPR selection function depends on the
number of two hop neighbors reachable through the candidate
node and its ’Willingness’ value obtained from Hello message.
This value indicates the readiness of a node, according to its
own resources, to forward the packets of its neighbors. Nodes
with higher willingness value are given higher priority to be
selected as MPR.
The main functionality of OLSR is neighbor sensing and
topology dissemination. Neighbor sensing is accomplished
through the periodic exchange of Hello messages, in which
every node advertises its neighbor set along with the state
of the link connecting it to each neighbor. In addition to
that, it indicates whether a given neighbor has been chosen
as MPR or not. To disseminate the topological information,
each MPR node broadcasts periodically a TC message that
contains its MPR selectors set. Using this information, each
node constructs a partial topology graph of the network which
allows it to establish routes to non-neighboring nodes.
Since TC messages are flooded across the whole network,
the attack can occur either at the origin or forwarding point.
The damage resulted from targeting a TC message is more
severe than that caused by misusing Hello messages as the TC
messages are used globally by the whole network for routes
calculation. A malicious node may simply send a TC message
claiming to be the MPR of nodes although it is not. Therefore,
as the network depends on the MPRs for routing services, a
malicious node that manages to become an MPR can easily
launch a black hole attack on the network. In what follows,
we present the strategy adopted by a node to launch a black
hole attack.
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TABLE II: Example of Hello message sent by node M
Originator-adr 1-hop neighbors
M T, B, D
• Gain an MPR position in the network: a simple way
for a malicious node to be an MPR is to set constantly
its willingness field to the highest allowed value regard-
less of its available resources. Thus it compels all its
neighbors to elect it as MPR. Besides, it may force a
target node to select it as the only MPR by spoofing
links with all its 2-hop neighbors as described below.
To illustrate this scenario, let us consider the network
topology depicted in Fig. 3, where the nodes A and C
constitute the MPR set of the node T. The malicious
node M generates its Hello message in which it advertises
the non-neighboring nodes B and D as its neighbors, as
illustrated in Table II. According to the MPR computation
heuristic [16], the node T must choose M as the only
MPR node, as shown in Fig. 4, since it has connections
to the whole set of its two hop neighbors (B, D). Notice
that the node M can learn the T’s two hop neighbors set
by analyzing the received TC messages along with the
T’s Hello message.
• Drop all control or data packets supposed to be
relayed: as an MPR, a node can carry out the following
disruptions:
– Correctly participates to TC message forwarding
function but fails to deliver data packets for other
nodes.
– Drops all TC messages sent or relayed by its MPR
selector nodes. For example, in the network topology
depicted in Fig. 5 the malicious node M refuses to
relay the TC messages generated by the node T. Thus
this makes the routes towards the MPR selectors of
node T unknown for the rest of the network. The
Fig. 6 illustrates that, where the nodes A1, A2 and
A3 are hidden from the nodes B and C because the
T’s TC message has not been received.
– Colludes with another neighbor MPR node to make
the previous attack harder to be detected as illustrated
in [50].
In heterogeneous networks such as MANETs the status of
asymmetric links is more likely to be observed. As an example,
the topology depicted in Fig. 7 shows two asymmetric links
connecting T1 with T2 and T2 with M . Malicious nodes (such
as node M in Fig. 7) may get benefits from that and exploit it to
launch a black hole attack. To do so, the node M tries to create
a false symmetric link between T1 and T2. The establishment
of this fake symmetric link requires five steps as follows:
msg1: T1 −→ ∗ : Hello, {∅}.
During neighbor discovery phase, the node T1 broadcasts
an empty Hello message that reaches both nodes T2 and
M .
Fig. 5: The network topology held by the nodes B and C before
the attack, where they are able to communicate with the T’s
MPR selectors nodes.
Fig. 6: The network topology held by the nodes B and C after
the attack, where the nodes A1, A2 and A3 are unknown for
them.
msg2: T2 −→ ∗ : Hello, {T1, ASYM}.
Next, the node T2 advertises, in its Hello message, that
the node T1 is an asymmetric neighbor.
msg3: M −→ T1 : Hello, {T1, ASYM}.
Upon receiving the message msg2, the node M maliciously
forwards it to the node T1 albeit it is not supposed to do.
msg4: T1 −→ ∗ : Hello, {T2, SY M}.
When the message msg3 reaches the node T1, it finds its
identity included in the advertised neighborhood list and
consequently it concludes that it is a symmetric neighbor of
T2. Hence, it advertises this new link status in its Hello message.
msg5: T2 −→ ∗ : Hello, {T1, SY M}.
On receiving the Hello message msg4, the node T2 changes its
link status with T1 to symmetric.
As a result, the victim nodes T1 and T2 infer that they are
connected through a symmetric link while it is not. So, all
control packets, such as TC messages, generated by the MPR
selectors of node T2 will not reach the whole network. As a
result, the network may be partitioned.
Notice that ∗ denotes the dissemination of a message and
{Id, link} refers to the content of Hello message, where Id
is the neighbor identity and link is the status of the link
connecting the sender of the message and the node Id.
B. Inter-layer attack
In this attack, the malicious node modifies the default
configuration of IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, for example it
denies the response to the RTS packet sent by its neighbors
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Fig. 7: Fake symmetric link created between nodes T1 and T2
Fig. 8: Inter-layer attack description
rather than sending a CTS (Clear To Send) packet after the
SIFS (Short Inter Frame Space) period. When the CTS timeout
expires, the sender of RTS infers that the malicious node
didn’t receive it correctly (i.e, a collision is occurred), as
stated in [4]. Thus it retransmits the RTS after waiting for a
new backoff time. After several retransmission attempts (RT-
attempts), the sender of RTS abandons the transmission of the
corresponding data frame whenever the number of attempts
reaches the SRL (Short Retry Limit) as depicted in Fig. 8.
This attack may disrupt the route discovery process in reactive
routing protocols, such as AODV, when the malicious node
drops the RTS of the RREP packet, which leads to initiating a
new route discovery. Moreover, this misbehavior can trigger a
route maintenance process since the sender node will conclude
that the link with the malicious node is broken. Consequently,
the network performance degrades sharply.
IV. SECURE MANETS AGAINST BLACK HOLE ATTACK
Recently, many investigations have been done in order to
improve the security in MANETs, most of which are relied
on cryptographic based techniques in order to guarantee some
properties such as data integrity and availability. In what
follows, we give a snapshot of the mostly used cryptographic
primitives in MANETs.
A. Overview of the cryptographic primitives
As MANETs become more ubiquitous, the need for pro-
viding adequate security tools gets to be more obvious. The
existing security schemes in such networks use generally
one or more of the following cryptographic technologies:
symmetric-key cryptography [15], digital signature [3], thresh-
old cryptography [1] and one way hash chain [2]. Each
of these cryptographic primitives has its specific advantages
and drawbacks. For example, the security schemes based on
digital signature and threshold cryptography generate much
more computational overhead than those based on symmetric
cryptography. However, the security approaches that are solely
based on symmetric-key cryptography are less robust and offer
less security than asymmetric key cryptography, due to the
higher probability that the shared keys being compromised. As
one way chains are known to be very efficient for verification,
they became increasingly popular for designing security proto-
cols for hand-held devices. This is due to the fact that the low-
powered processors are able to compute a one way function
within milliseconds, but would require tens of seconds or up to
minutes to generate or verify a traditional digital signature [8],
[22]. Consequently, recent wireless ad hoc network’s security
protocols extensively use one way chains to design protocols
that scale down to resources constrained devices.
These cryptographic schemes are known to be efficient to
ensure several properties such as confidentiality, data integrity
and non repudiation. However, they cannot be adopted in
MANETs since a Certificate Authority (CA) or a Key Distrib-
ution Center (KDC) are not always available. Moreover, these
techniques cannot prevent a malicious node from dropping
packets supposed to be relayed, which is our focus in this
survey. In Table III, we point out the main advantages and
drawbacks of the cryptographic primitives presented above.
B. Taxonomy of the proposed solutions in the literature
There are basically three defense lines devised to protect
MANETs against the packet dropping attack as illustrated in
Fig. 11. The first defense line (for prevention purposes) aims
to forbid the malicious nodes from participating in packet
forwarding function. Whenever the malicious node exceeds
this barrier, a second defense line (for incentive purposes)
is launched, which seeks to stimulate the cooperation among
the router nodes via an economic model. Finally, once the
two previous defense lines have been broken, a third one
(for detection/reaction purposes) is launched aiming to reveal
the identity of the malicious node and excludes it from the
network.
First defense line schemes
Many researchers have been interested to develop several
mechanisms to identify the malicious nodes that attempt to
involve themselves in the routing path, and then take control
over data/control packets. In the sequel, we give an overview
of the major proposals which aim to recognize the malicious
nodes at earlier stage of misbehaving before causing any
damage to the network.
The authors of [12] have proposed a solution to cope with
the black hole attack in AODV. First, they suggest to disable
the ability of an intermediate node to send a RREP and allow
only the final destination to do that. This technique avoids
the black hole problem but increases the route establishment
delay, especially in the case of large networks. Furthermore,
since no authentication is used in RREP message a smart
1n is the chain’s length.
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TABLE III: Cryptographic primitives comparison
Approach
Symmetric-key Asymmetric One way
cryptography cryptography hash chain
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
C
ri
te
ri
a Speed Fast Slow Fast
Scalability Not scalable scalable scalable
Computational overhead Moderate High Lighweight
Clock synchronization No No Mandatory
Storage capacity Large Large O(log (n))1
DoS Resiliency Resilient Not resilient Resilient
attacker can forge a RREP message on behalf of the legitimate
destination (by spoofing its IP address). As such, this solution
is inappropriate for coping with this attack. To overcome
these shortcomings, they have proposed another solution which
requires that the intermediate node adds its next hop’s infor-
mation to the RREP packet before sending it. On receiving this
packet, the source node sends a special packet to the next hop
of the intermediate node in order to verify that it has a route
to the destination and also it is a neighbor of the intermediate
node. This special packet contains a field dubbed check result
which might be filled by the next hop node. When the source
node receives the reply to this packet it extracts the check
result information and decide accordingly whether this route
is safe or not. If so, it sends out the data packets, otherwise it
initiates a new route discovery or waits for subsequent RREPs.
While this solution can avoid the black hole attack launched by
a single node, it is unable to detect a collusive attack conducted
by both of intermediate and next hop nodes. Moreover, its
main disadvantage is the induced overhead if the check process
is repeated for each intermediate node replying to the RREQ.
To ascertain the safety of the established path, a new scheme
is proposed in [13] to secure AODV. This scheme can be
briefly described as follows; once the normal path discovery
procedure is finished, the source node sends special control
packets to request each originator of RREP packet to send back
its current neighbor set. On receiving more than one reply,
the node starts comparing the received neighbor sets. If the
difference between them is larger than a predefined threshold
then a black hole attack is identified. To mitigate its impact, a
cryptography-based reaction mechanism is designed, whereby
the source node recognizes the true destination. Subsequently,
a new control message is sent to the destination to establish
the correct path. This method can reduce the likelihood of
a successful black hole attack, but it cannot guarantee its
prevention.
To secure OLSR against the colluding black hole attack,
in which two malicious MPR nodes collude each other to
prevent TC messages from being relayed correctly, a solu-
tion is proposed in [36]. This solution is based on a slight
modification to the standard Hello message by adding the 2-
hop neighbors set to the advertised set of one hop neighbors.
Based on this information, any node can detect whether one of
its neighbors has sent a false Hello message by searching any
contradiction between the received neighbor sets. This solution
can prevent the nodes that spoof links with non-neighboring
nodes from being selected as MPR. However, the high mobility
of nodes can paralyze the network due to the huge number of
the induced false alarms. Moreover, these contradictions can
no more stand if the attacker spoofs links with far-away (more
than two hops away) or not existing nodes.
TOGBAD approach was proposed in [43] to defend against
colluding black hole attack in tactical MANETs, in which a
successful attack can lead to human life loss. The proposed
solution is designed to secure OLSR protocol, however it
is suitable for any routing protocol based on Hello message
exchange. Each network node extracts the neighbors list from
the received Hello messages and sends it to the supervisor
node. This latter, which is the only node running the TOGBAD
scheme, uses the received information to construct the network
topology graph. This graph is built based on the Cluster-Based
Anomaly Detector (CBAD) introduced in [20] and [35]. Next,
upon reception of a message from a node, the supervisor node
extracts the number of neighbors claimed by the sender node
and compares it with the size of this sender’s neighbor set as
calculated from the topology graph. If the difference between
the claimed neighbors set and the one extracted from the graph
exceeds a predefined threshold, then the supervisor concludes
that this is an attempt to launch an attack and consequently an
alarm is triggered. The extra messages sent by each node to
the supervisor leads to an enormous control overhead increase
in the network. Likewise, an excessive increase in computation
overhead at the supervisor node is also observed. Therefore,
this scheme is not suitable for MANETs due to the limited
energy and computation resources of wireless nodes.
The herein described approaches aimed at attacks avoidance
by means of preventing malicious nodes from being selected
as part of the routing path of data packets. According to [7],
the attacks can be avoided by prevention based mechanisms
only if the applied techniques are perfect, which is hard to
achieve in MANETs. Otherwise, someone will find out how
to get around them; for example, in OLSR a malicious node
can participate correctly to MPR selection phase however it
fails to forward data packets when it is selected as MPR. In
such case prevention techniques are useless. Besides, most of
MANUSCRIPT SUBMITTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 7
the attacks and vulnerabilities have been the result of evading
the prevention mechanisms. Given this reality, detection and
response are vital approaches for MANETs.
Second defense line schemes
As we have mentioned in section II, a selfish node does
not want to waste its resources for the benefit of other nodes.
Hence, it refuses to forward other’s packets but it still uses
their services to communicate. To cope up with such behavior,
one possible solution is to deprive the selfish node from the
services provided by the rest of the network. Therefore, it will
be obliged to cooperate. Otherwise it will be isolated from the
network and never get its packets forwarded. This class of
solutions is also referred to as Incentive based schemes.
One of the most reputable works in this category is the
model introduced in [9]. This work proposes the use of a
virtual currency, dubbed nuglets, as a payment currency in
order to motivate each node to forward other’s packets. Using
nuglets, the authors have proposed two payment models: the
Packet Purse Model (PPM) and the Packet Trade Model
(PTM). In the former model, the packet sender loads some
nuglets in the packet before sending it. The forwarder of this
packet earns some nuglets as a payment for the service. If
the quantity of nuglets in the packet reaches zero, then it is
dropped. In the latter model, as opposed to the former one
the packet’s final destination rewards the intermediate nodes
using its own nuglets. This model can be described as follows:
each intermediate node earns some nuglets by buying a packet
from its previous node for some nuglets and then selling it to
the next node for more of nuglets, and the total cost will be
paid by the destination. The main drawback of this technique
is how to ensure that some nodes do not sell the same packet
to more than one neighbor to earn extra money? And how to
ensure that each receiver indeed has enough money to pay for
the service?
To implement both of these models, each node is equipped
with a tamper resistant security module that maintains the
nuglets counter in order to prevent the nodes from illegitimate
increase of their own nuglets.
Another sound work is the protocol SIP (Secure Incentive
Protocol) proposed in [44]. In contrast to the previous
schemes, SIP adopts a payment model in which node
remuneration is accomplished by charging both source and
destination nodes and rewarding the intermediate nodes.
Moreover, the adopted model allows a node to transmit
some extra packets when it has not enough credit for all the
packets ready to be sent. The security of the payment process
is achieved by dint of tamper-proof module embedded in
each node. SIP is designed to work with any secure reactive
protocol such as Ariadne [11] and ARAN [25]. The major
weakness of this technique is the unfairness problem. The
nodes situated in the network edges are less involved in the
routing path due to their locations, therefore they cannot earn
enough credit to send their packets.
Third defense line schemes
Most of the proposed solutions to handle packet droppers
fit into this defense line. Hence, to conduct an in depth study
we have classified them into five categories according to their
basic ideas:
• Passive feedback based schemes: it encloses all the so-
lutions whose the principle consists in overhearing the
neighbor’s transmission to check its legitimacy.
• AACK-based schemes: in this category, a node might re-
quest an acknowledgment from its succeeding neighbors
to confirm the well reception of its packet.
• Reputation-based schemes: it represents the solutions that
judge a node is malicious or well-behaved according to an
assessment of its trustworthiness level which is computed
based on several observations of its behavior.
• Cross-layer cooperation based schemes: this class illus-
trates the cooperation between two or more layers to
either detect or enhance the detection accuracy of packet
droppers. A given layer might make another layer aware
of the beginning and the end of some operations or the
values of some metrics in order to ensure better efficiency
and accuracy.
1) Passive Feedback based schemes:
Watchdog [6] is the first work that has dealt with the
problem of nodes which agree to forward packets but never do
so. It is designed to secure the DSR protocol and is based on
the passive feedback technique, described as follows: (i) first,
the watchdog node A transmits the packet (p) to its next hop
B, as shown in the Fig. 9. (ii) then it overhears the medium,
using the promiscuous mode 2 to ensure that B has correctly
forwarded the packet (p) towards C. If a misbehaving node
is identified in the path towards the destination node, then
a response mechanism dubbed Path-rater is launched. The
goal of path-rater is to establish a new route that avoids the
misbehaving nodes.
This scheme suffers from several weaknesses, as stated in
[6]. Since a packet collision might occur and prevent the
packet to reach the intended receiver, a forwarder node should
not immediately be accused of misbehaving, but rather ob-
served for a longer period to make an accurate decision. So, the
detection of malicious nodes can take a long time. Moreover,
power control transmission and collusion between group of
nodes can trick the watchdog node. Finally, a malicious node
can falsely accuse a legitimate node as misbehaving in order
to exclude it from the network.
Many techniques have been proposed to enhance the ro-
bustness of Watchdog. Among them, the work presented in
[17] which proposes to choose more than one Watchdog
node to avoid the devastating impact of false reports sent
by the malicious nodes. To this end, the nodes are classified
to ordinary, trusted and Watchdog nodes in terms of their
trustworthiness. The trusted nodes are assumed to be the first
nodes that initially form the network. The Watchdog nodes are
selected periodically from the trusted nodes exclusively. On
2When the promiscuous mode is enabled, it allows the node to capture all
the frames sent in its vicinity regardless of their destination addresses, and
then sends them to the higher layers for analysis purposes.
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receiving the first reply for the route discovery process that has
launched, the source node sends out in the secure Watchdog
channel a special message to inform the Watchdog nodes about
the ongoing transmission. Then, these nodes start monitoring
the intermediate nodes connecting the source and destination
nodes in order to report any misbehavior. This scheme can
indeed detect and isolate the malicious nodes acting alone or in
groups, however the induced overhead due to the new control
messages is important.
In order to cope with the aforementioned problem of false
reports, Ex-Watchdog is proposed in [39]. In this scheme, each
node maintains a table containing information about all the
paths it is involved in. Each entry of this table stores the
following information: identifiers of the source and destination
nodes, the identifier of the path connecting the source to the
destination and finally the sum of all packets sent, forwarded or
received through this path. Upon receiving a message reporting
an intermediate node as malicious, the source node will not
increase the failure tally of this node immediately as the
Watchdog does. However, it sends out a special message to
the destination node through an alternative path. This message
contains the same fields as each entry in the table except that
the path identifier is replaced by the malicious node’s address.
When the destination node receives this message, it checks
first if there is a matching entry for the source and destination
addresses in the table.
If so, then it compares the sum value received and the one
kept in its table. If the two values match then the accused
node is not malicious since all the packets sent by the source
are received at the destination. In contrast, if the two values
are different, then a reaction mechanism is triggered.
If no matching entry exists, then the reported node is
malicious. As a result, a confirmation message is sent back
to the source node. The absence of an alternative path to the
destination makes the source unable to check the correctness of
the report, and thus cannot recognize which node is malicious;
the reporter or the reported.
2) ACK based schemes:
To circumvent the limitations of the passive feedback based
solutions, an explicit acknowledgment has been used by sev-
eral schemes as a way to confirm the well reception of a packet
by the far-away neighbors.
a) ACK-based schemes in reactive protocols:
Two hop ACK based scheme is proposed in [27] to over-
come the limitation of passive-feedback technique when power
control transmission is used. To implement this scheme, an
authentication mechanism is used to prevent the next hop from
sending a forged ACK packet on behalf of the intended two
hop neighbor. The main drawback of this scheme is the huge
overhead. In order to reduce the overhead, the authors have
proposed in [30] that each node asks its two hop neighbor
to send back an ACK randomly rather than continuously.
Likewise, this extension also fails when the two hop neighbor
refuses to send back an ACK. In such situation, the requester
node is unable to distinguish who is the malicious node, its
next hop or the requested node.
To overcome the previous ambiguity in determining the
true malicious node, [38] focuses on detecting malicious links
instead of malicious nodes. The authors propose the 2ACK
scheme to detect malicious links and to mitigate their effects.
This scheme is based on 2ACK packet that is assigned a fixed
route of two hops in the opposite direction of the received data
traffic’s route. In this scheme, each packet’s sender maintains
the following parameters; (i) list of identifiers of data packets
that have been sent out but have not been acknowledged
yet, (ii) a counter of the forwarded data packets, (iii) and
a counter of the missed packets. According to the value of
the acknowledgement ratio (Rack), only a fraction of data
packets will be acknowledged in order to reduce the incurred
overhead. This technique overcomes some weaknesses of the
Watchdog/pathrater such as: ambiguous collisions, receiver
collision and power control transmission.
Both of the previous works remain vulnerable to the attacks
launched by group of nodes. To counter these attacks, [32]
provides a framework to mitigate the damage caused by the
colluding black hole attack in AODV. The proposed technique
has a moderate overhead induced by the ACK sent back by the
destination during selected intervals of data transfer period.
Throughout the data packets transmission, a flow of special
packets is transmitted at random intervals along with the data.
The reception of these special packets invokes the destination
to send out an ACK through multiple paths. The ACK packets
take multiple routes to reduce the probability that all ACKs
being dropped by the malicious nodes, and also to account
for possible loss due to broken routes or congestion in certain
nodes. If the source node does not receive any ACK packet,
then it becomes aware of the presence of attackers in the
forwarding path. As a reaction, it broadcasts a list of suspected
malicious nodes to isolate them from the network.
b) ACK-based schemes in proactive protocols:
The authors of [49] have proposed a simple mechanism to
detect the malicious nodes that drop TC packets in OLSR.
To do so, these nodes spoof links with the target’s two hop
neighbors in order to gain an MPR position in the network.
This approach requires that each node receiving TC message
has to send an authenticated ACK back to the TC’s source
node. This requirement is carried out only if the receiver node
is two hop neighbor of the TC’s source node. In this scheme,
each MPR node maintains a table containing its entire two
hop neighbors set of link tuples and their corresponding trust
values. During MPR selection phase, any node involved at
least in one tuple whose the trust value equal to 0 should not
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be chosen as the unique MPR. Therefore, any misbehavior
from a neighbor node can be easily detected.
We have proposed in [50] a three hops acknowledgment
based scheme to cope with the cooperative black hole attack
in OLSR. Our scheme adds two extra packets to OLSR, Hello-
rep packet which is a slight modification to Hello message
and a small acknowledgment packet. In this solution, each
MPR node M acquires the list of its 3-hop neighbors reached
through a distinct pairs of two consecutive MPR nodes (M1,
M2), where M2 is the MPR node of M1 and this latter is
the MPR of the node M. Afterwards, the node M selects one
node, from this list, to which it requests an authenticated
acknowledgment as a confirmation of the reception of the
TC message that it has generated/forwarded. Notice that the
authentication process is carried out using a pre-established
secret key between node M and the requested node. If the
number of missed acknowledgements overtakes a predefined
threshold then the MPR nodes M1 and M2, relaying M and the
requested node, are considered as malicious and consequently
they will never be selected as MPR.
c) Requirements of ACK-based schemes:
All the nodes running a solution based on acknowledgment
need to maintain a timeout (To) value. This timeout represents
an upper bound of the time that the sender node has to wait
for the ACK to arrive. The determination of this timeout value
is critical since a small value induces a large number of false
accusations and a large value increases the memory required
to store the outgoing packets for further comparisons. Fig. 10
depicts an example of the lower bound of the timeout value
maintained by node A for the reception of Two hop ACK from
node C. The timeout value should be greater than the estimated
threshold (Th) value which can be calculated as follows
Th = T2 − T1 (1)
where T1 and T2 are the sending (reception) time of the
packet (ACK), respectively. This threshold is estimated for a
successful transmission at MAC layer without any retransmis-
sion, which is not a realistic assumption in MANETs, thus the
timeout value should satisfy the following condition
To > Th+ (AV G RT × 1 hop delay) (2)
where AV G RT is the average number of retransmissions
of a packet at MAC layer, and 1 hop delay is the one hop
transmission delay which includes packet transmission delay,
random backoff delay at the MAC layer and the processing
delay.
3) Reputation based schemes:
The reputation is the art of using historic observation about
the behavior of a node to determine whether it is trustworthy
or not. Each node must form an opinion regarding the other
nodes based on their observed past behaviors. Then the nodes
with low reputation are punished or avoided while establishing
routes. The major drawback of this category is the excessive
traffic exchange needed for sharing the reputation information
between the nodes. Moreover, a serious vulnerability of rep-
utation based schemes is the fact that any compromised node
can send forged reputation information in order to decrease the
trust level of some nodes. In what follows, we describe three
representative schemes that use the reputation mechanism.
In [10], CONFIDANT protocol is introduced in order to
secure source routing protocols against adversary nodes. This
protocol aims to exclude the malicious nodes from partici-
pating to the route discovery phase and route the packets
around them. The exclusion of these nodes is carried out using
a dedicated reputation system. CONFIDANT consists mainly
of the following elements: (i) the monitor, (ii) the reputation
system, (iii) the trust manager, and (iv) the path manager. The
role of the monitor is to ensure that each packet sent by a node
is correctly forwarded by its next hop. This is achieved through
the use of passive-feedback technique or by observing route
protocol behavior. If an anomaly is detected, the node triggers
an action via the reputation system. This latter manages a
table containing the identifiers of all the known nodes and
their corresponding rating. This rating is updated only if a
sufficient evidence of misbehavior is acquired. In its turn, the
trust manager is responsible for sending and receiving alarm
messages that inform the nodes about the detected adversaries.
Finally, the path manager is responsible for launching the
adequate reaction and guarantees the establishment of safe
routes.
CONFIDANT is suitable for small networks with low
mobility; however it might be less efficient for large networks
since each node needs to maintain a huge table for reputation
purposes. Likewise, the high mobility of nodes increases
significantly the communication overhead. Additionally, this
protocol inherits all the problems of passive-feedback based
schemes since it uses this mechanism for the monitoring
function.
Another scheme based on reputation system is the so
called Friend and Foes that has been proposed in [18]. This
scheme aims to prevent the selfish nodes from disrupting
the network operations by refusing to participate correctly to
the forwarding process. Its idea is inspired from the society
principle which says that people agree to cooperate as long as
they notice that there is a fair tasks distribution in the group.
This scheme seeks to reward the cooperating nodes and punish
the selfish nodes which refuse to cooperate. In this scheme,
each node A advertises the set of nodes to whom it is not
willing to forward packets along with the set of its friends.
To do so, node A classifies the network’s nodes in three sets,
which are periodically updated, as described below. The friend
nodes set for which a node accepts to relay the packets, the
enemy nodes set for which no service is provided and the
selfish nodes set which consists of nodes known to act as node
A is an enemy. When node A sends a packet it searches for a
route in which the next hop is a friend node and whenever it is
requested to forward a packet it does so only if the requester
node is a friend. The major drawback of this scheme is the
large number of packets exchanged to advertise the friends
and enemies sets.
A sound scheme is introduced in [48], in which the au-
thors have proposed a new anomaly detection system dubbed
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RADAR to detect anomalous mesh nodes in Wireless Mesh
Networks (WMNs) [28]. The salient features of RADAR
can be summarized as follows: (i) reputation is used to
evaluate each node’s behavior by abstracting and examining
the appropriate observations, e.g. data packets, a secure and
dependable reputation management mechanism is then used to
define, quantify and propagate the trust values of each node,
ensuring the robustness and accuracy of the normal profiles
feeding to detection engine; (ii) two light-weight anomaly
detectors were employed to capture the node’s behavior drifts
in terms of reputation by exploring their temporal and spatial
properties respectively, and they were seamlessly coupled to
achieve higher detection accuracy and lower false positive
rate. Notice that RADAR was specified and implemented with
DSR routing protocol in order to detect misbehaving nodes
that violate routing mechanisms at the network layer. It is
found efficient in detecting nodes, involved in packet drop
and spoofing attacks.
4) Cross-layer cooperation based schemes:
Most of the existing solutions rely on the Watchdog tech-
nique to ensure the correct forwarding of packets by the
neighboring nodes; however this technique suffers from certain
weaknesses, particularly when power control is applied. In
[40], the authors have proposed a low cost approach dubbed
(SMDP) to circumvent the aforementioned drawbacks of
Watchdog. They have designed a cross layer scheme that
ensures higher detection accuracy. In this scheme, it is required
that the routing protocol be aware of the beginning and end
of each continuous traffic routed through it. This can be ac-
complished through cross-layer cooperation between network
and session layers.
At the end of each session, every node involved in the
forwarding path sends out two signed packets, one to each
successor node containing the number of packets sent to it,
and the other packet towards its predecessor node contains the
number of packets received from it. According to the received
packets, each node broadcasts to its one hop neighbors a
special packet called Forwarding Approval Packet (FPA) as a
proof of its cooperation. On receiving this packet the neighbors
of the sender can judge whether this node has correctly
forwarded the packets or not. The main advantage of this
scheme is its high detection accuracy that significantly reduces
the number of false alarms.
5) Other schemes:
In this section we give a brief overview of the major
contributions which could not be affected to any of the
previous classes.
The authors of [19] have proposed two solutions to cope
with the black hole attack in AODV. In the first solution, it
is required that the source node waits until receiving more
than two RREPs after each broadcasted RREQ (i.e. multi path
routing). Upon reception of these messages the source node
checks any appearance of shared nodes between the identified
routes. If a shared node is identified then the source node sends
the data packets to the destination through multiple routes
using different packet IDs and sequence numbers. Otherwise,
no packet will be sent. Notice that the appearance of shared
nodes between different routes is not a sufficient condition
to guarantee their safety since a malicious node might be
involved in several routes. Moreover, this solution generates
additional computational overhead due to the extra processed
RREPs. Besides, if no shared node is identified then the source
node delays or abandons the transmission of the data packets,
leading to a severe degradation of the network performance.
To circumvent these drawbacks a second solution has been
proposed. This new solution exploits the packet sequence
number to detect the malicious nodes trying to hijack the
traffic flow. To this end, each node maintains two extra tables
containing the sequence numbers of the last packets sent
(received) to (from) every node in the network, respectively.
Upon reception of a RREP packet, the source node that has
initiated the RREQ compares the sequence number extracted
from the RREP and the one saved in its table. If they match
then the safe route is identified, otherwise the responding
node is deemed as malicious. This solution is faster than the
previous one, however a malicious node can easily analyze
the traffic passing in its vicinity and update its tables by
the adequate packet sequence number, thereby it avoids the
detection scheme.
Since the mobility of nodes is the most apparent feature of
ad hoc networks, the conventional schemes based on static
training data might not be efficient to deal with the black
hole attack in such environment. [45] provides an alternative
proposal that takes into account the rapidly changing topology
of the network. This proposal uses the destination sequence
number as a metric to detect any deviation from the normal
network state. This state is updated dynamically at regular
time intervals in order to enhance the detection accuracy. A
special component named discrimination module of anomaly
detection is used to distinguish the normal states from the
abnormal ones. Its role is to measure the amount of deviation
and compare it to a predefined threshold to find out whether
an attack is occurred in the path toward the destination. To
conclude, this scheme is effective to deal with the black hole
attack in highly mobile networks however the update interval
is a critical metric that should be assigned an appropriate value
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that ensures a better accuracy and performance.
In addition to the herein presented contributions, the reader
may refer to the following papers to enrich its knowledge
regarding the packet dropping attack [51], [46], [31], [37] and
[33].
C. Discussion
As described in Fig. 11, most of the solutions in different
defense lines are routing layer dependent but cooperation with
session layer would improve the detection rate as stated in
[40]. Furthermore, since packets might be dropped due to
MAC protocol rules as illustrated in section II, an additional
diagnostic provided by MAC layer remains a key component
for a robust detection scheme. This cooperation may signifi-
cantly reduce the false alarms by discerning normal behavior
from the malicious one (i.e. the inter-layer attack described in
section III-B).
A summary of the characteristics of the surveyed schemes
is presented in Table IV. In this table, we emphasize the most
prominent features of each scheme in terms of its robustness,
scalability, induced overhead and the reaction mechanism
adopted to exclude the detected attackers. Moreover, this table
allows us to identify the strong and weak points of each
scheme in order to develop an eventual hybrid solution that
merges two or more schemes, from different defense lines,
together to ensure a perfect protection against the packet
droppers. The features of each scheme are highlighted based
on the following metrics:
• The defense line to which the scheme belongs.
• Its robustness against the collusive black hole attack, in
which two or more nodes collude to launch the attack.
• The additional overhead generated by the scheme in
terms of the new packets sent and the extra computations
required to carry out the scheme.
• The impact of the scheme on routing protocol’s perfor-
mance such as end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio.
• Is the scheme providing any reaction technique to penal-
ize the detected attackers?
• Is the scheme scalable to large networks? i.e. whether
the scheme maintains its efficiency when the network
becomes larger and dense.
• The architecture of the scheme: centralized, distributed
or stand-alone; defined as follows:
Centralized: the core part of the scheme is running on
an unique supervisor node which monitors the whole
network and the rest of nodes need to report to the
supervisor node for information processing.
Distributed: all the nodes run the same scheme and
exchange information between each other.
Stand-alone: similarly, each node runs the same scheme
however the communication between nodes is not neces-
sary.
Another summary of the main assumptions and limitations
of each class of the schemes studied throughout the paper is
provided in Table V. As we can see from this table all these
approaches are built on a set of assumptions that are either
unrealistic or hard to achieve in a hostile environment like
MANETs. Hence these assumptions limit the applicability of
these approaches to some specific network configurations and
constitute their major drawbacks.
V. CHALLENGES
As discussed in the previous sections, most of the proposed
solutions are built on a number of assumptions which are
either hard to realize in a hostile and energy constrained
environment like MANETs or not always available due to the
network deployment constraints. Moreover, these solutions are
generally unable to launch a global response system whenever
a malicious node is identified. In contrast, they either punish
the malicious node locally without informing the rest of
the network or divulge its identity to the network through
costly cryptographic computations. Moreover, even though the
malicious node is punished in a part of the network it can
move to another part and continues causing damage to the
network until it is detected again. Due to these reasons, many
challenges have to be carefully considered in order to design a
robust solution to cope with the packet dropping attack. These
challenges can be summarized as follows. First, the attackers’
behaviors are tailored to the specific routing protocol, making
it impossible to build a general model for characterizing
the attacker. Secondly, how to use this model to achieve a
high-level resistance against these attacks while maintaining
network performance. Recently, most of the proposed solutions
are focused on adding new components to the original protocol
to assess the deviation of the neighboring nodes and monitor
their behaviors. However the use of these additional compo-
nents might remove an important performance optimization. A
simple way to secure MANETs against the increasing threat
of the packet droppers without affecting their performance is
to take into account the security metric at an earlier stage
of the design process of routing protocols. This new design
process could be similar to the co-design technique used for
developing the embedded systems. A complementary way to
achieve the best trade-off between security and performance
is to aggregate the three defense lines discussed in this paper
to guarantee the cooperation of nodes in the network.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a survey of the state
of the art on securing MANETs against packet dropping
attack. The attack schemes, as well as prevention, detection
and reaction mechanisms have been explored. We categorized
them into three categories according to their goals and their
specific strategies. A comparative study between them was
then conducted to highlight their respective effectiveness and
limitations. We concluded that most of the proposed schemes
in the first, second or third defense line are based upon certain
assumptions that are not always valid due to the dynamic
nature of MANETs and their specific characteristics. Many
researchers have been motivated to apply game theory to
enforce nodes cooperation in MANETs, such as the works
done in [24] and [34], by examining its similarities with the
social behavior of human in a community. These works assume
that a node tries always to maximize its benefit by choosing
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whether to cooperate in the network or not. However, those
works are generally based on the assumption that the majority
of the nodes are misbehaving, which is not an usual case
in MANETs. We believe it is an interesting and significant
topic for further exploration with more realistic assumptions,
especially tailored for packet dropping attack.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Shamir, How to Share a Secret, Communications of the ACM, 22(11):
612-613, November 1979.
[2] L. Lamport, Password Authentication with Insecure Communication,
Communications of the ACM, 24(11): 770-772, November 1981.
[3] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of
Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, October 1996.
[4] IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN media access control (MAC) and physical
layer (PHY) specifications, ANSI/IEEE Std 802.11, 1999.
[5] D. B. Johnson and D. A. Maltz, The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (Internet-Draft), Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET) Working Group, IETF, October 1999.
[6] S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai and M. Baker, Mitigating routing misbehavior
in mobile ad hoc networks, In Proc. of the 6th annual international
conference on Mobile computing and networking (MOBICOM ’00),
Boston, Massachusetts, USA, August 2000.
[7] B. Schneider, Secrets and Lies. Digital Security in a Networked World,
John Wiley & Sons, inc, 1st edition, 2000.
[8] M. Brown, D. Cheung, D. Hankerson, J. Hernandez, M. Kirkup, and
A. Menezes, PGP in constrained wireless devices, In Proc. of the 9th
USENIX Security Symposium ,Denver, Colorado, August 2000.
[9] L. Buttyan and J. P. Hubaux, Nuglets: A Virtual Currency to Stim-
ulate Cooperation in Self-organized Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Swiss
Federal Institution of Technology, Lausanne, Switzerland, Tech. Rep.
DSC/2001/001, January 2001.
[10] S. Buchegger and J. Y. Le Boudec, Performance Analysis of the CON-
FIDANT Protocol, In Proc. of the 3rd ACM International Symposium
on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & computing (MOBIHOC’02), Lausanne,
Switzerland, June 2002.
[11] Y. C. Hu, A. Perrig and D. B. Johnson, Ariadne: A secure On-Demand
Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks, In Proc. of the 8th ACM
International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking , Westin
Peachtree Plaza, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, September 2002.
[12] H. Deng, W. Li and D. P. Agrawal, Routing security in wireless ad hoc
networks, IEEE Communication Magazine, 40(10): 70-75, October 2002.
[13] B. Sun, Y. Guan, J. Chen and U. W. Pooch, Detecting black- hole attack
in mobile ad hoc networks, In Proc. of the 5th European Personal Mobile
Communications Conference, Glasgow, UK, April 2003.
[14] C. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer and S. Das, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV) Routing, IETF RFC 3561 (Experimental), July 2003.
[15] W. Mao, Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Prentice Hall
publisher, July 2005.
[16] T. Clausen and P. Jacquet, Optimized Link State Routing Protocol
(OLSR), IETF RFC 3626 (Experimental), October 2003.
[17] A. Patcha and A. Mishra, Collaborative Security Architecture for Black
Hole Attack Prevention in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, In Proc. of Radio
MANUSCRIPT SUBMITTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 13
TABLE IV: Characteristics of the surveyed schemes
Characteristics
Defence Defense against Computation Communication Latency Scalability Punishment Architecture
line the collusive attack overhead overhead
Watchdog [6] 3rd N Low N N Y N Distributed
CONFIDANT [10] 3rd N Low Low N Y Y Distributed
H. Deng 1 [12] 1st N/A N N N Y N Distributed
H. Deng 2 [12] 1st N Low Low Y Y N Distributed
B. Sun [13] 1st N/A Low Medium High Y N Distributed
Very high
TOGBAD [43] 1st N/A at the N N Y N Centralized
supervisor node
Friend & Foes [18] 3rd N/A Low High High N Y Distributed
Al-Shurman
Scheme1 [19]
N/A N Low Medium High N N Stand-alone
Al-Shurman
Scheme2 [19]
N/A N/A Low N Low N N Stand-alone
Nuglets (PPM) [9] 2nd N/A Low N N N Y Stand-alone
Nuglets (PTM) [9] 2nd N/A Low N Low N Y Stand-alone
SIP [44] 2nd N/A Low low Low Y Y Stand-alone
SA-OLSR [49] 3rd N/A Low High N Y N Stand-alone
B. Kannhavong [36] 1st N/A Low N N Y N Stand-alone
Nidal et al [39] 3rd N/A Low Low N N N Distributed
SMDP [40] 3rd N Medium Medium N N N Distributed
K. liu [38] 3rd N Low Low N Y N Stand-alone
S. Ramaswami [32] 3rd Y Low Low N Y Y Distributed
Two hop Ack [27] 3rd N High High N N N Stand-alone
Random Two hop
Ack [30]
3rd N Low Low N Y N Distributed
Three hop Ack [50] 3rd Y Medium Low N Y N Distributed
RADAR [48] 3rd N Low Low N Y Y Distributed
and Wireless Conference (RAWCON ’03), Boston, Massachusetts, USA,
August 2003.
[18] H. Miranda and L. Rodrigues, Friends and Foes: Preventing Selfishness
in Open Mobile Ad hoc networks, In Proc. of the 23rd International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW’03),
Providence, RI, USA, May 2003.
[19] M. Al-Shurman, S. M. Yoo and S. Park, Black Hole Attack in Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks, In Proc. of the 42nd Annual Southeast Regional
Conference (ACMSE’04), Huntsville, ALabama, USA, April 2004.
[20] M. Jahnke, J. Tolle, M. Bussmann, and S. Henkel, Components for
Cooperative Intrusion Detection in Dynamic Coalition Environments, In
Proc. of NATO/RTO IST Symposium on Adaptive defense in Unclassified
Networks,Toulouse, France, April 2004.
[21] Y. Hu and A. Perrig, A Survey of Secure Wireless Ad Hoc Routing,
IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(3): 28-39, May 2004.
[22] M. Fischlin. Fast verification of hash chains, In Proc. of the RSA
Security Cryptographer’s Track, CT-RSA 2004 : topics in cryptology ,
San Francisco CA, February 2004.
[23] W. Yu, Y. Sun and K. R. Liu, HADOF: Defense Against Routing
Disruptions in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, In Proc. of the 24th IEEE
INFOCOM, Miami, USA, March 2005.
[24] E. Altman, A. Kherani, P. Michiardi and R. Molva , Non cooperative
forwarding in ad hoc networks, In Proc. of the 4th IFIP International
Conferences on Networking, Waterloo, Canada, May 2005.
[25] K. Sanzgiri, D. LaFlamme, B. Dahill, B. Levine, C. Shields, and E.
Belding-Royer, Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks, IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, 23(3): 598-610, March 2005.
[26] D. Djenouri, L. Khelladi and N. Badache, A survey of Security Issues
in Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, IEEE Communications Surveys
& Tutorials, 7(4): 2-28, Fourth Quarter 2005.
[27] D. Djenouri and N. Badache, New Approach for Selfish Nodes De-
tection in Mobile Ad hoc Networks, In Proc. of Workshop of the 1st
International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in
Communication Networks (SecurComm’05), Athens, Greece, September
2005.
[28] I. F. Akyildiz and X. Wang, A Survey on Wireless Mesh Networks,
IEEE Communications Magazine, 43(9), S23-S30, September 2005.
[29] P. Argyroudis and D. O’Mahony, Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc
MANUSCRIPT SUBMITTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 14
TABLE V: A comparison on the different approaches: assumptions and drawbacks
Main assumptions Limitations
Passive Feedback based schemes Promiscuous mode operation is mandatory Inherits all the Watchdog’s drawbacks
No collusion amongst nodes
ACK-based schemes Authentication mechanism is deployed Huge overhead generated due to the extra
Acknowledgment packets sent.
The requested node always sends back the
intended Acknowledgement
Decision ambiguity if the requested node
refuse to send back an Acknowledgment.
Reputation-based schemes Preestablished list of friend (trusted) nodes Overhead induced in sharing reputation in-
formation amongst the nodes
Incentive-based schemes Tamper resistant hardware is mandatory for
the operations of this category of solutions.
Legitimate nodes might be punished indi-
rectly due to their location in the network.
A node can sell the same packet several
times to earn more money.
Networks, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 7(3): 2-21, Third
Quarter 2005.
[30] D. Djenouri and N. Ouali and A. Mahmoudi and N. Badache, Random
Feedbacks for Selfish Nodes Detection in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, In
Proc. of the 5th IEEE International Workshop on IP Operations and
Management (IPOM’05), Barcelona, Spain, October 2005,
[31] V. Balakrishnan, V. Varadharajan and U. K. Tupakula, Fellowship:
Defense against Flooding and Packet Drop Attacks in MANET, In Proc.
of the 10th IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium
(NOMS 2006), Vancouver, Canada, April 2006.
[32] S. S. Ramaswami and S. Upadhyaya, Smart handling of Colluding black
Hole attacks in MANETs and Wireless Sensor Networks using Multipath
Routing, In Proc. of the Workshop on Information Assurance, United
States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 21-23 June 2006.
[33] Y. R. Tsai and S. J. Wang, Two-tier authentication for cluster and
individual sets in mobile ad hoc networks, Computer Networks, 51(3):
883-900, February 2007.
[34] Z. Ji, W. Yu and K. J. Ray Liu, Cooperation Enforcement in Autonomous
MANETs under Noise and Imperfect Observation, In Proc. of the 3rd
Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and
Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (IEEE SECON), Reston, VA,
USA, September, 2006.
[35] Tolle, M. Jahnke, N. gentschen Felde, and P. Martini, Impact of Sanitized
Message Flows in a Cooperative Intrusion Warning System, In Proc.
of the 25th Military Communications Conference (MILCOM 2006),
Washington, DC, October 2006.
[36] B. Kannhavong, H. Nakamaya and A. Jamalipour, A Collusion Attack
Against OLSR-based Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, In Proc. of the Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM ’06), San Francisco, Califor-
nia, USA, Nov/Dec 2006.
[37] C. Basile, Z. Kalbarczyk and R. K. lyer, Inner-Circle Consistency
for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE
COMPUTING, 6(1): 39-55, January 2007.
[38] K. liu, J. Deng, P. K. Varshney and K. Balakrishnan, An
Acknowledgment-Based Approach for the Detection of Routing Misbe-
havior in MANETs, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING,
6(5): 536-550, May 2007.
[39] N. Nasser and Y. Chen, Enhanced Intrusion Detection System for
Discovering Malicious Nodes in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, In Proc. of
the Internationl Conference on Communication (ICC 07), Glasgow, June
2007.
[40] T. Fahad, D. Djenouri and R. Askwith. On detecting Packets Droppers in
MANET: A Novel Low Cost Approach, In Proc. of the 3rd International
Symposium on Information Assurance and Security, Manchester, UK,
August 2007.
[41] X. Wu, D. K. Y. Yau, Mitigating denial-of-service attacks in MANET
by incentive-based packet filtering: A game-theoretic approach, In Proc.
of the 3rd International Conference on Security and Privacy in Commu-
nications Networks, Nice, France, September 2007.
[42] T. R. Andel and A. Yasinsac, Surveying Security Analysis Techniques in
MANET Routing Protocols, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
9(4): 70-84, Fourth Quarter 2007.
[43] E. Gerhards-Padilla, N. Aschenbruck, P. Martini, M. Jahnke and J.
Tolle. Detecting Black Hole Attacks in Tactical MANETs using Topology
Graphs, In Proc. of the 33rd IEEE Conference on Local Computer
Networks (LCN), Dublin, Ireland, October 2007.
[44] Y. Zhang, W. Lou, W. Liu and Y. Fang, A secure incentive protocol
for mobile ad hoc networks, Wireless Networks journal, 13(5): 569-582,
October 2007.
[45] S. Kurosawa, H. Nakayama, N. Kato, A. jamalipour and Y. Nemoto,
Detecting Blackhole Attack on AODV-based Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by
Dynamuic Learning Method, International Journal of Network Security,
5(3): 338-346, November 2007.
[46] P. Agrawal, R. K. Ghosh and S. K. Das, Cooperative black and gray
hole attacks in mobile ad hoc networks, In Proc. of the 2nd International
Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
(ICUIMC 2008), SKKU, Suwon, Korea, Jan/Feb 2008.
[47] M. Amitabh, Security and quality of service in ad hoc wireless networks,
Cambridge University Press; 1st edition, March 2008.
[48] Z. H. Zhang, F. Naı¨t-abdesselam, P. H. Ho and X. Lin, RADAR: a
ReputAtion-based scheme for Detecting Anomalous nodes in wiReless
mesh networks, In Proc. of the IEEE Wireless Communications and
Networking Conference (WCNC2008), Las Vegas, USA, March 2008.
[49] B. Kannhavong, H. Nakamaya, Y. Nemoto, N. Kato and A. Jamalipour,
SA-OLSR: Security Aware Optimized Link State Routing for Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks, In Proc. of the International Conference of Communica-
tion (ICC 2008), beijing, China, May 2008.
[50] S. Djahel, F. Naı¨t-Abdesselam and A. Khokhar, An Acknowledgment-
Based Scheme to Defend against Cooperative Black Hole Attacks in
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol, In Proc. of the International
Conference on Communication (ICC 2008), beijing, China, May 2008.
[51] Z. Li, C. Chigan and D. Wong, AWF-NA: A Complete Solution
for Tampered Packet Detection in VANETs, In Proc. of the Global
Communications Conference (IEEE GLOBECOM 08), New Orleans, LA,
USA, NOV/DEC 2008.
MANUSCRIPT SUBMITTED TO IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 15
Soufiene Djahel is pursuing his PhD at University
of Lille1 since October 2007. Prior to that, he
was an engineer researcher at INRIA Lille Nord
Europe research center, from July to December
2007. He has obtained his engineer degree in
computer science and a magister degree in net-
working and distributed systems from University
Badji Mokhtar of Annaba and University Abder-
rahmane Mira of Bejaia in 06/2004 and 02/2007,
respectively. The research interests of Soufiene
Djahel lie in the field of security in wireless multi-
hop networks, particularly he focuses on securing routing protocols and
MAC layer misbehavior issues. He is reviewer of many conferences and
journals in the networking and security field. Soufiene Djahel is an IEEE
and IEEE ComSoc student member.
Farid Naı¨t-abdesselam obtained his engineer-
ing degree in computer science from University
of Sciences and Technologies Houari Boumedi-
ene(USTHB) Algiers, Algeria, in 06/1993 and a
master degree in computer science from Uni-
versity of Paris Descartes - France, in 09/1994.
After two years spent in the industry working
as a software engineer, he joined the University
of Versailles Saint Quentin, (UVSQ) France in
01/1996, and got his PhD degree in computer
science in 01/2000. During the year of 1998, he
worked as an associate researcher at University of Western Ontario,
London Ontario Canada, on distributed interactive virtual environment
and multimedia communications over ATM networks. From 09/1999 to
08/2000 he was an assistant professor at University of Sciences and
Technologies of Lille - France. From 09/2000 to 08/2003 he worked
as an associate professor at INSA of Lyon and a research member
of INRIA Rhne Alpes. Since 09/2003 he is an associate professor at
University of Sciences and Technologies of Lille and till 09/2007 a research
member of the INRIA Lille Nord Europe. His research interests lie in
the field of computer and communication networks with emphasis on
architectures and protocols for quality of service and security in IP
based networks, mobile ad-hoc, sensor, vehicular, and mesh networks,
and overlay networks. Farid Naı¨t-abdesselam is on the editorial board
of Wiley Int. J. of Communication Systems, Int. J. of Internet Protocol
Technology, Int. J. of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing and Int. J.
of Computer Networks and Distributed Systems. He has been on the
technical program committee of different IEEE and ACM conferences,
including GLOBECOM, ICC, LCN, and MSWiM, and regularly invited
to chair some of their sessions. He is chairing/has chaired the IEEE
International Workshop on Wireless Local Networks, the IEEE/ACS
International Workshop on Internet Services, and the International
Workshop on Peer to Peer Networking. He has served as Editorial Liaison
chair of the IEEE LCN Conference, and publicity co-chair of many
conferences. Farid Naı¨t-abdesselam is a member of the IEEE, IEEE
Communications Society, and IEEE Computer Society.
Zonghua is an associate professor of Institut
TELECOM/TELECOM Lille1, France. Previ-
ously, he was an expert researcher at the Infor-
mation Security Research Center of NICT, Japan
from April, 2008 to April, 2010. Even earlier, he
spent two years for post-doc research at the Uni-
versity of Waterloo, Canada and INRIA, France
after earning his Ph.D. in information science
from Japan Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology (JAIST) in March of 2006. Zonghua
also obtained a M.Sc. degree in computer science
and a B.Sc. degree in information science from Xidian University, China
in 2003 and 2000 respectively. His research embarked on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography and security evaluation, and is now focused on network
forensics analysis and reputation/security management.
